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that even if the contract could have made the settlement provisional, the
bank had not complied with the Code's requirement of prompt return of
the item and had lost its right to charge the item back to defendant's
account.22
The conclusions of the court, operating entirely under the provisions
of the U.C.C., are patterned closely after the law developed prior to the
Code's adoption. The cash payment of negotiable paper by the drawee is
final as between the parties to the payment, and if the drawer's funds
prove insufficient the drawee cannot then collect from the payee. It is
the responsibility of the drawee to know the state of the drawer's
account and he finalizes payment at his own risk.
RICHARD STAFFORD BRAY
Torts-MENTAL DIsTRss-RcoV ERY BY TIRD PERSON S. Archibald
v. Braverman, 275 Cal. App. 2d 290,-P.2d-, 79 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
Plaintiff's son was seriously injured by an explosive allegedly due to
defendant's negligence in selling the son explosive materials. Plaintiff
brought an action to recover damages for emotional trauma and mental
illness, which required institutionalization as a result of viewing her son's
injuries within moments after the explosion. Summary judgment was
granted for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.'
The District Court of Appeals of California reversed, holding that
even though the mother did not actually witness the explosion, she
would be entitled to recover if negligence of the defendant were proved.2
The court in Archibald, following the rationale of Dillon v. Legg,'
responsibility beyond its exercise of due care. All items are credited sub-
ject to final payment and to receipt of proceeds of final payment in
cash or solvent credits by this bank at its own office.
Id. at 93 n.6, 168 S.E.2d at 277 n.6.
22. UmFoRm COMMERCIAL CODE §5 4-212(3), 4-301 provide that in order to revoke
a settlement, the payor bank before its midnight deadline must return the item or
send written notice of dishonor or nonpayment if return is unavailable.
1. The Superior Court of Riverside County hearing this case in February, 1968, based
its decision on Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513,
29 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963), where a mother was denied recovery for injuries sustained as
a result of emotional shock and mental disturbance received upon witnessing the
defendant's truck run over her infant child.
2. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 290, P.2d , 79 Cal. Rptr. at 723.
3. 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). Dillon, decided prior to
the appeal in Archibald, overruled Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., and
became new precedent. In determining whether the defendant should reasonably
1969] CURRENT DECISIONS
reasoned that the shock sustained by the mother viewing her child's
injuries immediately after the explosion was so "contemporaneous" as
to satisfy the "observance" factor.4
At common law, courts were reluctant to allow recovery for injury
resulting from "mental disturbance" or "emotional shock" caused by
negligent conduct.5 After recognizing the validity of certain claims
arising from mental distress and emotional trauma,' the courts placed
strict limitations on recovery in cases where a bystander suffered mental
or emotional distress as a result of witnessing a negligently inflicted
injury.7 While the impact rule, which requires actual physical injury
resulting from the mental distress, was repudiated in most United States
jurisdictions,8 recovery by a person who suffered injury as a result of
witnessing the negligent conduct was nevertheless denied unless that
person feared for his own safety or was within the zone of danger.9
foresee the injury to the plaintiff the Dillon court considered the following factors:
(1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident; (2) whether the
shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the contemporane-
ous observance of the accident; and (3) whether the plaintiff and the victim were
closely related. Id. at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
4. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 292, - P.2d at -, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
5. E.g., Southern Express Co. v. Byers, 240 U.S. 612 (1915); Kaufman v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955), cer. denied, 350 U.S. 947 (1956);
Beaty v. Buckeye Fabric Finishing Co., 179 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
6. See, e.g., Southern Tel. Co. v. King, 103 Ark. 160, 146 S.W. 489 (1912), where
there is another element of recoverable damages upon which a cause of action might
be based; Smith v. Gowdy, 196 Ky. 281, 244 S.W. 678 (1922), where the presence of
another legal injury might lead to recovery; Spade v. Lynn & Boston R.R., 172 Mass.
488, 47 N.E. 88 (1898), where the emotional disturbance is accompanied by a bodily
impact; Studebaker v. Pittsburgh Ry., 260 Pa. 79, 103 A. 532 (1918), where there is
attending or ensuing injury to person or body of plaintiff.
7. Of course in "impact" states recovery is denied outright to one who suffers only
mental injury by witnessing the negligent injury of a third person. Oblatore v.
Brauner, 283 F. Supp. 761 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Duet v. Cheramie, 176 So. 2d 667
(La. Ct. App. 1965); Knaub v. Gotwalt, 422 Pa. 267, 220 A.2d 646 (1966). However,
even in other states a negligent person historically has not been liable to one who
witnessed the accident even though it caused severe mental distress resulting in
illness or physical injury. E.g., Maury v. United States, 139 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal.
1956); Koontz v. Keller, 52 Ohio App. 265, 3 N.E.2d 694 (1936); Van Hoy v. Ola-
homa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 205 Okla. 135, 235 P.2d 948 (1951).
8. Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402 (1941); Purcell v. St. Paul
City R. Co., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892); Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App.
422, 140 N.E.2d 322 (1955); See generally Annor., 64 A.L.R. 2d 100, 143 (1959).
9. E.g., Hopper v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 314 (D. Colo. 1965) (zone of danger);
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel, & Supply Co, 59 Cal. 2d 295, 379 P.2d 513, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33
(1963) (zone of danger); Lindley v. Knowlton, 179 Cal. 289, 176 P. 440 (1918) (fear
for own safety); Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 156 A.2d 149 (1959) (both);
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Fear of fraudulent claims was one of the principle reasons given for
the limitations placed upon such recovery,' and before Dillon there
were few exceptions to this rule."
The court in Dillon opened the door to increased liability. Criticizing
the artificial limitations and their justifications,"2 and setting its own
standards more along the lines of reasonable foreseeability, 3 the court
established three criteria merely as guidelines to determine the degree of
a defendant's foreseeability. 4 Thus, a finding of reasonable foreseeability
would be guided by the following factors: (1) whether the plaintiff
was located near the scene of the accident; (2) whether the shock re-
sulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the
contemporaneous observance of the accident; and (3) :whether the
plaintiff and the victim were closely related. 5 In recognition of its
judicial importance, the decision has been criticized and praised,'6 though
its effect other than in Archibald is still speculative.' 7
Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479, 86 A.2d 879 (1952) (zone of danger); Frazee v.
Western Dairy Prod., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935) (both); Klassa v. Mil-
waukee Gas Light Co., 273 Wis. 176, 77 N.W.2d 397 (1956) (both); Waube v. War-
rington, 216 Wis. 603, 258 N.W. 497 (1935) (both).
10. Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603, 613, 258 N.W. 497, 501 (1935). But see
15 STAx. L. Rav. 740, 749 n.40 (1963). One rationale, more consistent with tort theory,
is that there is no duty of care owed to the plaintiff since substantial distress re-
sulting from fear for the safety of a third person is not foreseeable. Resavage v.
Davies, 199 Md. 479, 484, 86 A.2d 879, 881 (1952). Another rationale asserted is
that the negligent act is not a proximate cause, the injury being a remote and specula-
tive consequence. Strazza v. McKittrick, 146 Conn. 714, 718-19, 156 A.2d, 149, 151-52
(1959); Williamson v. Bennet, 251 N.C. 498, 508, 112 S2E.2d 48, 55 (1960). But see
J. FLEmiNG, INTRoDUCTIoN To THE LAW OF ToRTs 54 (1967); F. HAPaER & F. JAMES,
TmE LAW OF ToRTs 1039 (1956); W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs 353-54 (3rd cd.
1964).
11. Spearman v. McCrary, 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912); Cohn v. Ansonia
Realty Co., 162 App. 791, 148 N.Y.S. 39 (1914); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Coopwood,
96 S.W. 102 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906). The leading case in England is Hambrook v.
Stokes Brothers, [1925] 1 K.B. 141. Though often criticized Hambrook was affirmed
in Boardman v. Sanderson, [1964] 1 W. L. R. 1317. Moreover, through legislation,
New South Wales, in enacting the Law Reform Act of 1944, S 4(1) (b), extended
liability of the negligent person to any member of the family of the victim who
suffers injury from mental or nervous shock who was within the sight or hearing
of such victim which would encompass the instant case.
12. 68 Cal. 2d at -, 441 P.2d at 917-19, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 77-79.
13. Id. at -, 441 P.2d at 919-21, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-81.
14. Id. at -, 441 P.2d at 921, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 81.
15. 68 Cal. 2d at 740-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 80.
16. See 18 BuFFALo L. Rav. 201 (1969); CATHOLIC U.L. Rav. 258 (1968); 37 FoRDHAm
L. REv. 429 (1969); 38 U. CINc. L. Rav. 185 (1969); 1969 Wis. L. REv. 661 (1969);
10 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 764 (1969).
17. There are no cases prior to Archibald expressly following the minority view
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Archibald has opened the door still wider in its liberal interpretation
of the factors of foreseeability set forth in Dillon,' by allowing re-
covery where in fact the plaintiff did not actually witness the negligently
caused occurance.19 While Dillon removed the arbitrary limitation that
the plaintiff must be within the zone of danger, Archibald has now re-
moved the limitation that plaintiff actually witness the occurance caused
by the negligence of the defendant. °
Development of the law in this area has shown a trend away from
the rigid restrictions against recovery for emotional distress.21 Dillon
adopted in Dillon. Some consideration has been given to the effect Dillon might have
in New York. New York, once an impact state, Mitchell v. Rochester R.R., 151 N.Y.
107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896), later adopted the majority position. Battella v. State, 10
N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961). Tobin v. Grossman, 30 App.
Div. 2d 229, 291 N.Y.S.2d 227 (1968), denied recovery to a mother who witnessed
the defendant's vehicle strike and injure her infant son causing ensuing mental and
physical suffering, though two earlier decisions which allowed recovery, Bond v.
Smith, 52 Misc. 2d 186, 274 N.Y.S.2d 534 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Haight v. McEwen,
43 Misc. 2d 582, 251 N.Y.S.2d 839 (Sup. Ct. 1964), have led to the view that New York
still awaits a more determinative decision. See 18 BUFFALo L. Rav. 201, 207-08
(1969); 37 FoRDuAm L. Rav. 429, 441-43 (1969).
18. In applying the factor of "direct emotional impact from sensory and con-
temporaneous observance of the accident" the court said that "the shock of seeing
a child severely injured immediately after the tortious event may be just as pro-
found as that experience in witnessing the accident itself. Consequently, the shock
sustained by the mother herein was 'contemporaneous' with the explosion so as to
satisfy the 'observance' factor." 275 Cal. App. at -, P.2d at -, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
19. The leading case under a similar fact situation is Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174,
71 A.2d 792 (1950). The only case allowing recovery can be factually distinguished
from the instant case. Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891 (La. Ct. App. 1954).
20. Archibald will undoubtedly invite comment from those who have already voiced
an opinion in this area of recovery where plaintiff did not specifically witness the
tortious act. Prosser, who has stated "that when a child is endangered, it is not beyond
contemplation that its mother will be somewhere in the vicinity, and will suffer serious
shock," has also recognized the need for even the arbitrary and somewhat unjustifiable
limits to the extension of liability, including that the shock be fairly contemporaneous
with the accident or peril rather than when plaintiff is informed at a later time.
W. PaossER, LAW OF TORTS, 353-54 (3rd ed. 1964). Professor Amdursky, while ad-
mitting "from the standpoint of foreseeability of mental anguish, there seems little
to choose between the case where a mother sees her child negligently run down by an
automobile and a case where after the accident, discovers the injured and bleeding
body," has said "/r/ecovery should be confined to those plaintiffs who have actually
witnessed the injury first hand." Amdursky, The Interest in Mental Tranquility, 13
BuFvAro L. R~v. 339, 348 (1964). See also Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance
in the Law of Torts, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1033 (1936).
21. Even the majority of states, which would deny recovery to the bystander in
abandoning the impact rule which ultimately denied recovery to the bystander, have
eased their limitation to liability in adopting the prevailing zone of danger or fear for
personal safety views. See supra note 10, See also Throckmorton, Damages for Fright,
34 HArv. L. Rav. 260 (1921).
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was the initial step in the removal of arbitrary limitations, though recog-
nizing the need for some guidelines in the area of bystander recovery.
Archibald, in liberally construing these guidelines, has accelerated the
trend. With the possibility of New York supplying additional momen-
tum,22 one might look forward to the gradual acceptance of this more
equitable though challenging approach in the area of recovery for
emotional and mental distress.
ROBERT L. WALKER
Criminal Law-DOUBLE JEoPARDY-Benton v. Maryland, 89 S. Ct.
2056 (1969).
The defendant was tried in a Maryland state court on charges of
burglary and larceny. He was acquitted of larceny, but convicted of
burglary. Due to a defect in the composition of the grand and petit
juries, the defendant was forced to waive the former jeopardy of lar-
ceny, and was retried and convicted on both counts." Upon appeal the
Supreme Court in reversing the larceny conviction held that freedom
from double jeopardy is a fundamental constitutional right 2 that is im-
posed upon the states through the fourteenth amendment.3
The underlying rationale of double jeopardy is that the state should
not be permitted to make repeated attempts to convict an individual to
embarrass him and compel him to live in a continuous state of anxiety
and insecurity.4 Prior to adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the
Supreme Court in Fox v. Ohio held that double jeopardy was largely a
federal concern, and in no way applied to the states.5 While the Bill of
Rights already contained the double-jeopardy clause, many states never-
22. See supra note 17.
1. Benton v. Maryland, 89 S.Ct. 2056 (1969). Because the grand and petit juries had
been unconstitutionally selected under a section of the state constitution that de-
manded jurors to swear their belief in the existence of God, the Maryland Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court where defendant was given the "option"
of serving his ten-year sentence for burglary, or demanding reindictment and a new
trial.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V'"... [NIor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."
3. Maryland argued one cannot be placed in jeopardy by a void indictment. The
Supreme Court found that only by accepting a new trial could the former indictment
and sentence be set aside. There was really no choice or option involved and one cannot
be forced to waive his rights of former jeopardy.
4. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
5. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
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